Abstract: Information disclosure is of critical importance in enhancing the quality of collective negotiations. As for the information in individual cases, there is no information disclosure mechanism at the technical level in China’s labor-capital relationship, which further deteriorate the weak position of the workers in the collective bargaining who are already short of the right to collective action; the labor conflicts, including the “sporadic”, may appear more disordered. The research results show that, considering the reality of the labor-capital relationship adjustment, industrial relation stability, labor relation harmony, and social harmony, it is necessary to strengthen the information disclosure obligations of the employers in the collective negotiations, so as to minimize workers’ misunderstandings and misconceptions caused by asymmetric information in negotiations. When restraining labor conflicts, both employers and employees can have a fair play under the conditions allowed by the market rules, so as to create favorable conditions for the labor-capital autonomy.

Key words: collective negotiation; workers’ rights; information disclosure; responsibility defining