Will Managerial Power Affect Bank Loan Contracts?

Abstract

Abstract: By making use of the data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017, this paper examines the relationship between corporate managerial power and bank loan contracts. The results show that the increase of managerial power will significantly reduce the size of bank loans, and the access to bank long-term loans would be more difficult. The level of marketization development can effectively alleviate the negative effect of management power on bank loan contracts. The extended analysis finds out that the greater the power of the company’s managers, the higher the company’s operating risks, and the lower the company’s solvency and the quality of earnings information, which would lead banks to raise the credit conditions. The heterogeneity of company management, the ownership structure, the level of government intervention and the level of rule of law all have a certain moderating effect on the relationship between the managerial power and bank loan contracts.

Key words: marketization development, managerial power, bank loan contract

CLC Number:

F275.5

YAN Huan-min, ZHANG Yan-hua, LI Yao-yao. Will Managerial Power Affect Bank Loan Contracts?[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2020, 0(3): 126-136.

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