Abstract: Through collecting the data of bank loans of China’s listed enterprises during the period of 2005-2016, this paper conducts a study based on the relationship between government and market in the process of China’s economic transition. The findings show that with the transform of government functions and the reform of banking system going deeper and deeper, the government intervention becomes much less powerful in the explanation of credit discrimination, and implicit guarantee becomes the main cause of credit discrimination. To be specific: (1) when the enterprise characteristics factors are under control or separated, there still exist significant differences between the state-owned enterprises and the private enterprises in their credit accessibility; (2) the banks’ credit policies towards enterprises with different ownership have no differences to banks and regions with different degrees of government intervention; (3) the lower the proportion of the tax paid by enterprises in the local financial revenue, the lower the proportion of fixed assets, the bigger the ownership difference of bank credit; (4) financial marketization can reduce the ownership differences of bank credits by hardening the soft budget constraints of SOEs. Under the background of deepening financial reform, how to further eliminate from the root the resource mismatching problems resulted from bank credit discrimination will be the direction for the next step financial reform.

Key words: credit discrimination, government intervention, implicit guarantee, financial marketization