Abstract: In recent years, China has formulated multi-azimuth credit control measures around the land, including the government special bond not to be allowed to use in land purchasing and storage, the financial institutions not to be allowed to provide financing for housing enterprises to pay land transfer fees, implementing the credit limited policy in purchasing houses, and restricting forcefully the credit leverage of the government, real estate enterprises and house buyers; however, the driving effect of the credit leverage of different departments on land transfer is still not clear. In order to clarify this problem, this paper tries to analyze the driving mechanism of credit leverage of different departments on the land transfer of local governments by introducing credit leverage constraints of different departments into the DSGE model. The results indicate that credit leverage is an important external factor driving local governments to sell land, and that among different kinds of credit leverages, the credit leverage at the stage of house purchase is playing a leading role. Compared with the credit leverage of real estate enterprises and government, the credit leverage of house buyers has a much stronger driving force on land transferring, which well explains the policy easing efforts that local governments have tried to loosen the constraints of real estate's loans on residents when faced with increased financial pressures. Therefore, the macro-control of real estate market should be focused on the limited credit policy for residents to buy houses, the credit loopholes at the house-purchase stage should be prevented, the “hard constraints” on house-purchase credits should be strengthened, a national cross-regional unified networking information system should be established, so as to improve the constraints of the limited credit policy.

Key words: local government, credit leverage, land transferring, DSGE model