Corporate Integrity Culture and Innovative R&D Manipulation

Abstract

Abstract: Taking China's listed companies in 2012-2018 as samples, this paper employs the methods of text analysis, ordinary least squares, instrumental variables and propensity score matching to investigate the impact of corporate integrity culture as an informal system on the behavior of innovative R&D manipulation. The results show that companies with integrity cultural background have a low degree of innovative R&D manipulation. The legal environment and corporate integrity culture have a certain substitution effect on the corporate innovative R&D manipulation, that is, when the legal environment is worse, the corporate integrity culture can inhibit corporate innovative R&D manipulation more effectively. As an equity incentive mechanism to alleviate agency problems, the impact of managerial shareholdings and corporate integrity culture on corporate innovative R&D manipulation has the same substitution effect, i.e., when the managerial shareholding is lower, the company integrity culture can more effectively inhibit the company's innovative R&D manipulation. Further research shows that in the influencing mechanism of corporate integrity culture on the innovative R&D manipulation, the internal control plays a part of intermediary role.

Key words: corporate integrity culture, R&D manipulation, legal environment, management shareholding, quality of internal control

CLC Number:

F275.5

BU Mei-wen. Corporate Integrity Culture and Innovative R&D Manipulation[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2020, 0(11): 88-99.

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