保险机构投资者与管理者薪酬契约

当代财经 ›› 2025, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (11): 102-114.

保险机构投资者与管理者薪酬契约

巩亚林^1a, 赖黎^1b, 玄宇豪²

1.西南财经大学 a. 金融学院 b.会计学院,四川成都 611130;
2.中山大学岭南学院,广东广州 510275

收稿日期:2024-10-03 修回日期:2025-04-24 出版日期:2025-11-15 发布日期:2025-11-11
通讯作者: 赖黎,西南财经大学副教授,博士生导师,管理学博士,主要从事行为金融研究,联系方式laili@swufe.edu.cn
作者简介:巩亚林,西南财经大学讲师,管理学博士,主要从事行为金融研究;玄宇豪,中山大学助理教授,管理学博士,主要从事行为金融研究。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金青年项目“管理者性格特征对企业财务决策的影响——基于语言文本分析技术”（72102188）; 西南财经大学研究生教育教学改革项目“心理学与财务管理”（2024YJG063）; 谢霖会计思想研究课题“新时代谢霖会计思想在市场化变革中的应用”（24XLKT012）; 国家自然科学基金青年项目“政府信息公开与投资者价格发现行为研究”（72402243）

Insurance Institutional Investor and Manager Compensation Contract

Gong Ya-lin¹, Lai Li¹, Xuan Yu-hao²

1. Southwest University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130;
2. Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China

Received:2024-10-03 Revised:2025-04-24 Online:2025-11-15 Published:2025-11-11

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 随着险资投资限制放开,保险机构投资者逐步成为中国资本市场中的重要参与主体。基于2008—2023年中国A股上市公司的数据,考察保险机构投资者对管理者薪酬契约影响的研究发现,在有保险机构持股的上市公司中,管理者超额薪酬显著降低,薪酬业绩敏感性有所提升,且在代理成本更高的公司中,保险机构投资者对管理者超额薪酬的约束更强。进一步分析显示,保险机构对不同产权性质企业的薪酬治理效应不存在显著差异;与国有保险机构相比,非国有保险机构的薪酬治理作用更为突出。上述结论在采用双重差分模型、工具变量法,以及以保险机构派驻董监高和其他持股衡量方式的稳健性检验后依然成立。研究结论表明,保险机构凭借耐心资本的长期属性对管理者薪酬发挥了积极的监督作用,有效提升了薪酬契约效率。基于此,政府层面可构建保险资金长期投资激励机制并完善监管规范体系,上市公司可通过引入保险机构投资者健全公司治理架构,投资者可将保险机构持股标的作为决策参考以优化投资选择。

关键词: 保险, 机构投资者, 耐心资本, 高管薪酬

Abstract: With the relaxation of restrictions on insurance capital investments, insurance institutional investors have gradually become key players in China’s capital market. Based on the data from China’s A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2023, this study examines the impact of insurance institutional investors on manager compensation contracts. The findings indicate that in the listed companies with insurance institutional ownership, managers’ excess compensation is significantly reduced, and the sensitivity of compensation to performance is enhanced. Moreover, the constraining effect of insurance institutional investors on managers’ excess compensation is stronger in firms with higher agency costs. Further analysis reveals that there is no significant difference in the compensation governance effect of insurance institutions on the enterprises with different nature of property rights. However, compared with the state-owned insurance institutions, the compensation governance effect of the non-state-owned insurance institutions is more prominent. The above-mentioned conclusions remain robust after the robustness checks by adopting a DID model, the instrumental variable method, appointment of directors, supervisors and senior executives by insurance institutions, as well as other share holding measuring methods. The findings suggest that insurance institutions play a supervisory role in managerial compensation with the long-term attributes of the patient capital, effectively improving the efficiency of compensation contracts. Based on this, the government can establish a long-term investment incentive mechanism for insurance funds and improve the regulatory standardized system. Listed companies can improve their corporate governance structure by introducing insurance institutional investors. Investors can use insurance institutional shareholding targets as decision-making references to optimize investment choices.

Key words: insurance, institutional investors, patient capital, executive compensation

中图分类号:

F275

巩亚林, 赖黎, 玄宇豪. 保险机构投资者与管理者薪酬契约[J]. 当代财经, 2025, 0(11): 102-114.

Gong Ya-lin, Lai Li, Xuan Yu-hao. Insurance Institutional Investor and Manager Compensation Contract[J]. Contemporary Finance & Economics, 2025, 0(11): 102-114.

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