Fiscal Pressure, Land Finance and Land Supply Strategy of Prefecture Level Governments

Abstract

Abstract: In the context of COVID-19 raging around the world and the severe situation of the international economy, the prefecture level municipal governments in China are faced with the unprecedented financial pressure. According to the theory of fiscal decentralization, this paper puts the changes of tax revenue distribution, land fiscal action and land supply strategy of prefecture level municipal governments into the analytical framework and conducts a regression analysis. The results show that faced with the financial pressure, the prefecture level municipal governments have a significant dependence on land fiscal revenue, and the western region is more dependent on land than the eastern and central regions. As for the path selection of land supply strategy, the prefecture level municipal governments are more inclined to adopt the financing mode of raising the average price of land supply. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct the reform in the following four aspects: (1) optimize the financial relationship among provincial, municipal and county governments, and implementing a differentiated tax sharing system. (2) improving the constraint and incentive mechanisms of local government officials, and reforming and adjusting the land management methods. (3) increasing the special transfer payment of finance by the central government, and integrating the similar special transfer payment funds scattered in the department management. ⑷ adjusting and optimizing the expenditure structure of local governments, and improving the efficiency of the use of fiscal funds.

Key words: prefecture-level governments, local fiscal pressure, land finance, land supply strategy, financial relationship between governments

HUANG Siming, WANG Qiao. Fiscal Pressure, Land Finance and Land Supply Strategy of Prefecture Level Governments[J]. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY FINANCE AND ECONOMICS, 2021, 0(1): 61-75.

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