Has the Off-Office Audit System for Natural Resources Assets on Leading Officials Improved the Structural Quality of the Manufacturing Industry?

Abstract

Abstract: The off-office audit of natural resources assets on leading officials is a major institutional innovation in the construction of ecological civilization in China. On the basis of theoretically explaining the mechanism of the pilot off-office audit of natural resource assets on the leading officials on the structural quality of the manufacturing industry, this paper adopts the panel data of China's 92 prefecture-level cities from 2012 to 2017 and employs the double difference (DID) method to empirically analyze the impact of the off-office audit of natural resource assets on leading officials on the structural quality of the manufacturing industry in pilot cities. The findings show that the off-office audit can significantly improve the rationalization degree and the upgrading degree of the industrial structure of the manufacturing industry in the pilot cities. It is revealed through further research on the impact mechanism that the pilot off-office audit can improve the innovative ability of the pilot cities, which in turn can improve the structural quality of the manufacturing industry. The results of the analysis of the moderating effect show that in the cities with greater pollution control pressure, the improving effect of the pilot off-office audit on the rationalization and upgrading of the manufacturing industrial structure is much more significant.

Key words: off-office audit of natural resources assets on leading officials, structural quality of manufacturing industry, innovation, green development

WU Changnan, SHUAI Yan. Has the Off-Office Audit System for Natural Resources Assets on Leading Officials Improved the Structural Quality of the Manufacturing Industry?[J]. JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY FINANCE AND ECONOMICS, 2023, 0(1): 134-151.

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